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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington, D. C.

53181

Copy No. 48

10 February 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen Evans, OIR  
General John Weckerling, G-2  
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI  
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN  
Captain R. G. McCool, JIG

SUBJECT : NIE-25: Soviet Intentions with Respect to  
General War.

1. In connection with preliminary work on a revision of existing estimates on Soviet capabilities and intentions, certain types of data should be brought up to date and revised by IAC agencies, and certain further questions analyzed. These requirements, as they apply to IAC agencies, are listed below. It is requested that as much of the necessary data as possible be furnished to this office by March 5, 1951, as contributions to a redraft of the Soviet estimate (projected NIE-25).

a. Department of State

(1) Status of Soviet morale with respect to psychological readiness for war and vulnerability to psychological warfare.

(2) Total economic potential relative to US and Western Europe. (The report just published by OIR should be adequate.)

b. Department of the Army

(1) Strength and combat efficiency of Soviet ground forces relative to projected NAT strength in Western Europe.

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(2) Soviet logistical capabilities (taking into account tactical stockpiles) to support specific military campaigns defined in terms of extent, duration, and levels of attrition. (ABI-14 campaigns, Appendix H, are satisfactory if defined as indicated.)

c. Department of the Navy:

(1) Capabilities of Soviet naval forces, particularly submarines, relative to US and NATO forces.

d. Department of the Air Force:

(1) Strength and offensive and defensive capabilities of Soviet air forces relative to projected NAT strength in Western Europe and US strategic air capabilities.

e. Central Intelligence Agency:

(1) O/RR: Current extent of conversion of industry and other economic resources to production for military use. Capabilities of the Soviet economy to meet essential civilian and military requirements in war-time, including consideration of strategic stockpiles.

(2) O/SI: Soviet capabilities for the production of weapons of mass destruction (atomic weapons, missiles, etc.).

FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

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cc: AD/SI  
AD/RR

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